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Closing Ranks: Montgomery 
Jews and Civil Rights, 
1954?1960 
CLIVE WEBB 
The arrest of Rosa Parks on 1 December 195 5 provided the spark which 
ignited the long smouldering resentments of black Montgomerians. For 
381 days they waged a boycott of the city bus lines, frustrating the 
opposition of white authorities and financially crippling the local transit 
company. More profoundly it resulted in a Supreme Court decision 
outlawing segregation on public transportation. Equally momentous was 
the emergence of the man who would serve as the spiritual figurehead of 
the civil rights movement: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
In the wake of the Montgomery bus boycott, one national black 
newspaper acclaimed King as "Alabama's Modern Moses." Since the 
darkest days of slavery African-Americans had sought spiritual salvation 
by comparing their own condition to that of God's Chosen People, the 
Israelites of the Old Testament. Throughout their years of enslavement 
they prayed for the Moses who would deliver them from their suffering 
unto the Promised Land. During the boycott, the black citizens of 
Montgomery had similarly sustained their morale by singing the old slave 
spirituals, raising their voices at the nightly mass meetings in rousing 
renditions of "Go Down Moses, Way Down in Egypt Land." "As sure 
as Moses got the children of Israel across the Red Sea," King exhorted the 
black community, "we can stick together and win." Others too drew the 
analogy between the historical experience of Jews and the contemporary 
predicament of African-Americans. Looking back on the boycott, white 
liberal activist Virginia Durr evoked the spectre of Nazi Germany in 
describing the strength of racist opposition.1 
Clive Webb is a Lecturer in American History in the Department of History, University 
of Reading, Whiteknights, P.O. Box 218, Reading RG6 6AA. 
1 
Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, eds., Voices of Freedom : An Oral History of the Civil 
Rights Movement from the 19JOS through the 19 Sos (London: Vintage, 1995), 30, 28 ; Howell 
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Ironically the parallel between the centuries of suffering endured by 
African-Americans and Jews was lost on one group of people. During the 
long, bitter struggle against segregation, the Jewish community in 
Montgomery acquiesced with the authorities in opposing the boycott. 
"Montgomery Jews want to bury their heads," asserted King, "and 
repeat that it is not a Jewish problem. I want to go on record, and agree 
that it is not a Jewish problem, but it is a fight between the forces of justice 
and injustice. I want them to join with us on the side of justice."2 
King expressed disappointment with the response of whites in general. 
He was however especially frustrated at the failure of Jews to assist the 
cause. Jews had suffered untold discrimination across the globe and down 
through the centuries. Their perseverance in the face of extreme prejudice 
had served as an inspiration to blacks suffering under the Jim Crow 
system. It was expected that they would show more sensitivity than other 
whites towards the boycott. As noted by the National Jewish Community 
Relations Advisory Council, "Negroes see Jews in the South as part of the 
hostile white community, yet as members of a minority group, from 
whom a measure of support for Negro aspirations should consequently be 
forthcoming. Because such support is less than expected, the hostility 
toward all whites is augmented in the case of Jews by an added measure 
of resentment." Some of this resentment was expressed by King himself. 
As he wrote to one Jewish activist: "I think we all have to admit, that 
there are Jews in the South who have gone out of their way to consort 
with the perpetrators of the status quo. I saw this in both Montgomery, 
Alabama and Albany, Georgia."3 
How then do we account for the hostility of Montgomery Jews? The 
historian David Chappell has recently analysed white reaction to the bus 
boycott. His study reveals that despite initial uncertainty the white 
community soon stood in collective opposition to desegregation. The 
small minority of dissenters were silenced by fear of the majority.4 It is the 
Raines, My Soul Is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered (New York: 
Penguin, 1983), 56. 2 William S. Malev, 
" 
The Jew of the South in the Conflict on Segregation," Conservative 
Judaism, 13:1 (Fall 1958), 45. 3 Martin Luther King, Jr. to Rabbi Jacob M. Rothschild, 28 Sept. 1967, Box 8, Folder 
1, Jacob M. Rothschild Papers, 1933-85, Special Collections Department, Robert W. 
Woodruff Library, Emory University, Atlanta; National Jewish Community Relations 
Advisory Council, Joint Program Plan, 1960?61, 15, National Jewish Community 
Relations Advisory Council Papers, New York. 4 David L. Chappell, Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 62, 69-71. 
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intention of this article to assess whether or not Jews were among the 
liberal faction forced under duress to dissociate themselves from the 
boycott. A specific case study of Montgomery reveals that the Jewish 
community was indeed concerned more with self-preservation than with 
the morality of the boycott. As will be seen, however, it also reveals some 
more 
unpleasant truths. 
These truths provide a further dimension to the continuing debate 
about the relationship between African-Americans and Jews. Since the 
1960s, scholars have produced a substantial literature on this subject. The 
overwhelming concern of such studies has been to trace the formation and 
eventual fracturing of a supposed political alliance between the two 
peoples. This alliance is alleged to have reached its apotheosis during the 
civil rights demonstrations of the early- to mid-1960s, but to have 
collapsed under the strain of the black separatist movement in the latter 
part of that decade.5 
In recent years, revisionist historians have challenged conventional 
notions about the relationship between African-Americans and Jews. 
Serious doubts have been cast upon the strength and cohesion of the 
alliance. In particular, questions have been asked as to whether those Jews 
who immersed themselves in the civil rights struggle drew their 
motivation from their distinctive ethnic and religious identity or were 
simply part of a broader white liberal movement.6 
This article offers a further dimension to the revisionist argument. The 
existing studies on the relationship between African-Americans and Jews 
have focused almost entirely upon cosmopolitan northern cities such as 
New York and Chicago. The interaction between the two peoples in the 
5 As Jack Salzman observes in the introduction to the latest anthology on this subject : 
"There was a time, not even so long ago, that 'Grand Alliance' would have been a 
more 
appropriate title for a volume devoted to the relationship between African 
Americans and American Jews." Salzman, "Struggles in the Promised Land," in Jack 
Salzman and Cornel West, eds., Struggles in the Promised Land: Toward a History of 
Black-Jewish Relations in the United States (New York and Oxford : Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 1. This theme is also explored in, among others, the following works : Paul 
Berman, ed., Blacks and Jews: Alliances and Arguments (New York: Delacorte, 1994); 
Murray Friedman, What Went Wrong? The Creation <& Collapse of the Black?Jewish 
Alliance (New York: Free Press, 1995); Jonathan Kaufman, Broken Alliance: The 
Turbulent Times Between Blacks and Jews in America (New York: Mentor, 1988); Michael 
Lerner, Blacks and Jews: Let the Healing Begin (New York: Putnam, 1995); Robert G. 
Weisbord and Arthur Stein, Bittersweet Encounter : The Afro-American and the American 
Jew (Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1970). 6 The revisionist interpretation can be found in Leonard Dinnerstein, A^ntisemitism in 
America (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 197-227. See also 
Salzman, 5, 8-9. 
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southern states has, in contrast, received relatively little attention.7 This 
has been a crucial omission. Closer scrutiny of the response of southern 
Jews to the desegregation crisis provides a contrasting perspective to the 
prevailing orthodoxy on black-Jewish relations. "The Jew in the South 
does not consider this problem on the simple basis of being either for or 
against the elimination of racial segregation," once observed the journalist 
Harry Golden. "In fact the Jew in the South rarely thinks at all in terms 
of the Negro."8 An examination of events in Montgomery not only 
challenges assumptions about the character of the political alliance 
between the two peoples, but questions its very existence. 
Jews first settled in Montgomery during the early nineteenth century. 
Not until June 1852 were there sufficient numbers to organize a formal 
congregation, Kahl Montgomery. It was a further eleven years before 
construction work was completed on Temple Beth-Or. During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Jewish community in 
Montgomery grew and diversified. By the 1950s, there were three 
different congregations. In addition to those who worshipped at the 
Reform temple Beth-Or were the Conservative congregation Agudath 
Israel and the smaller Sephardic congregation Etz Ayahem. Together 
these congregations included 1200 individuals, in a city with an overall 
population of 130,00o.9 
Despite the paucity of their numbers, Jews exerted a considerable 
influence in Montgomery, especially in economic affairs. Jewish names 
such as Weil, Cohen, and Klein figured prominently on the shop fronts in 
the downtown area. The president of the Chamber of Commerce, Max 
Baum, was also Jewish. Baum was but the latest Jew to hold high office 
in Montgomery: as early as the 1870s, Mordecai Moses had been elected 
mayor of the city.10 Such accomplishments reflected the sound relationship 
between Jews and Gentiles in the city. In 1952 Congregation Kahl 
7 
Salzman, 13. Struggles in the Promised Land is the first volume on the subject of 
black-Je wish relations to devote substantial attention to the southern states. See the 
articles by David Brion Davis, Jason H. Silverman, and Deborah Dash Moore. The 
most comprehensive analysis of the relationship between Jews and African-Americans 
in the South is provided in Mark K. Bauman and Berkley Kalin, eds., The Quiet Voices: 
Southern Rabbis and Black Civil Rights, 1880s to 1990s (Tuscaloosa and London : University 
of Alabama Press, 1997). 8 
Harry Golden, Only in America (New York: Permabooks, 1959), 126. A similar line of 
argument is adopted in Leonard Dinnerstein, 
" 
Southern Jewry and the Desegregation 
Crisis, 1954-1970," American Jewish Historical Quarterly, 62:3 (1973), 232-33. 9 The First 100 Years of Kahl Montgomery (Montgomery: Paragon Press, 1952); American 
Jewish Year Book (1955), 177. 10 Louis Schmier, ed., Reflections of Southern Jewry: The Letters of Charles Wessolowsky, 
1878-1879 (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1982), 72. 
This content downloaded from 139.184.30.134 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 11:23:40 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Closing Ranks 467 
Montgomery had celebrated its hundredth anniversary. The event elicited 
warm 
congratulations from such dignitaries as Mayor William Gayle and 
Governor Gordon Persons. 
The outbreak of the bus boycott only three years later suddenly 
threatened to destabilize the Jewish community. Although Montgomery 
Jews refrained from any involvement in the escalating struggle over civil 
rights, they were alarmed at the actions of their co-religionists in other 
parts of the country. Northern Jews had played a conspicuous role in the 
civil rights movement ever since the establishment of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1910. Among the 
signatories of the original naacp charter were a number of elite German 
Jews : Dr. Henry Moskowitz, Mrs. Lilian Wald, and Rabbis Emil Hirsch 
and Stephen S. Wise. Five years after the formation of the naacp, another 
Jew, Dr. Joel E. Spingarn, was elected chairman of the Board of 
Directors. Although originally established with the singular purpose of 
protecting the civil liberties of American Jews, defence agencies such as 
the Anti-Defamation League and American Jewish Committee had by the 
1940s also begun to lend their active support to the black cause.11 
It was therefore little surprise that Jewish civic, religious, and political 
organisations throughout the North should have championed the 
Supreme Court decision of May 1954. Evidence of the psychological 
damage suffered by black children in segregated schools was provided by 
both the American Jewish Committee and American Jewish Congress. 
The Anti-Defamation League had acted as a friend of the court in support 
of the naacp. After the Court had upheld the plaintiffs' case, an ecstatic 
Henry Schultz, national chairman of the adl, informed reporters that the 
decision "will wipe out the anachronistic 'separate but equal' doctrine 
that has been nothing more than a legal cover for the imposition of 
second-class status on millions of Negro citizens. The people of the South, 
white and Negro, will be the better for it."12 
The Montgomery bus boycott received equally enthusiastic support 
11 
Jack Salzman et al., eds., Bridges and Boundaries: African Americans and American Jews 
(New York: George Braziller, 1992), 193, 196; John P. Roche, The Quest for the Dream 
(New York: Macmillan, 1963), 134. The American Jewish Committee (ajc) was 
founded in 1906 by a group of wealthy German Jews. Appalled at the suffering of 
Russian Jews during the Tsarist pogroms, its members sought to combat anti-Semitism 
at home and abroad. The Anti-Defamation League (adl) was established in 1914. Its 
objective was the elimination of anti-Semitic literature within the United States. A third 
Jewish defence agency, the American Jewish Congress (ajc) appeared in 1917. In 
contrast to the other agencies, the Congress was dominated by Eastern European Jews. 
Unlike the adl and ajc, it also lacked any significant southern membership, and 
therefore avoided the sectional infighting that plagued the other two organizations. 12 Southern Israelite, 28 May 1954. 
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from northern Jews. Jews made significant donations to the mia.13 Their 
public expressions of sympathy emphasised the morality of the black cause 
and the dignity and determination of the boycotters themselves. This was 
never more true than during the Passover festivities of 1956. Passover 
commemorates the 
emancipation of the ancient Hebrews from their 
enforced servitude in Egypt. In the words of one rabbi, it is "a celebration 
of the spiritual idea of freedom." In the minds of many national Jewish 
leaders, the bus boycott in Montgomery was a potent expression of the 
struggle for human liberty. Mrs. Moise Cahn, president of the National 
Council of Jewish Women, urged greater effort on the part of every citizen 
to "ensure 
equal justice" for African-Americans. In an effort to destroy 
the morale of the boycotters the Montgomery police had resorted to 
tactics of intimidation and unfair arrest. On 26 January, Martin Luther 
King had himself been imprisoned after an alleged speeding offence. In his 
Passover address, Rabbi William Rosenblum of New York asserted that 
the conviction of the mia president "emphasises some of the amazing 
contradictions upon which the American people and the world should 
ponder." After the bomb attacks on the homes of both King and fellow 
mia activist E. D. Nixon, the Chicago Rabbinical Association similarly 
issued a resolution denouncing as "treasonable" any act of violence 
intended to undermine the integration process. The Association pro 
claimed 28 March a day of prayer for "the harassed Negroes of 
Montgomery, Ala."14 
Montgomery Jews responded with extreme indignation to the 
intervention of their northern co-religionists in the integration struggle. 
Harsh reprisals were exacted against the defence agencies. Membership 
subscriptions were cancelled. Donations dried up. The Jewish Federation 
of Montgomery in particular resorted to financial blackmail, threatening 
the cancellation of its annual financial contribution to its national 
organization, in an effort to silence public support of desegration. 
According to the sociologist Joshua Fishman, the Anti-Defamation 
League was similarly "plagued" with "resignations and protests."15 
Nor were Montgomery Jews alone in expressing their concern at the 
involvement of the organization in the racial crisis. One weekend in late 
October 1957, members of the adl national executive committee met with 
representatives from five Alabama cities in an effort to address their 
13 
Kaufman, Broken Alliance, 63. 14 New York Times, 24 Mar. 1956, 17; 25 Mar. 1956, 58; Chicago Daily Tribune, 24 Mar. 
1956, Pt. 2, 12. 15 Will Maslow, "My Brother's Keeper... Negro-Jewish Relations in the United States," 
World Jewry, 1:2 (1958), 5; Joshua A. Fishman, "Southern City," Midstream, 7:3 
(Summer 1961), 42. 
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escalating alarm. The opinions of the Alabama officials carried sufficient 
weight that a compromise proposal was agreed: "Whenever any public 
action shall be contemplated by the adl affecting a regional constituency, 
such action shall be taken only after consultation with such regional 
constituency ; in any public action by the adl, full consideration be given 
to the welfare and best interest of all Jews throughout the country, 
including those who reside in the region affected."16 
Similar turmoil was suffered by the American Jewish Committee. In 
1958 the organization called an emergency meeting to discuss its role in 
the civil rights movement. The meeting had been forced upon the 
Committee by the actions of the Montgomery Jewish Federation. Its 
members had the previous year threatened to shut off all funds to their 
parent organization unless the Ajc reconsidered its involvement in the 
integration struggle. The ajc had initially attempted to call the bluff of 
their blackmailers. The Federation, however, was not bluffing. In May 
1957 its members proceeded to cancel their annual financial allocation to 
the Committee. Tempers had not subsided by the time ajc delegates met 
in New Orleans. Montgomery businessman Leonel Weil seized the 
occasion to castigate the national executive for its failure to consult openly 
with southern members. Concerned to end the internecine 
squabbling, 
ajc officials agreed in similar terms to the adl compromise that they 
would seek the opinions of their southern members before engaging in 
any future civil rights activity.17 
What provoked such hostility towards the national defence agencies? 
The answer was more than a minor dispute over the unilateral manner in 
which northern officials determined tactics. Indeed the determining factor 
was fear. The involvement of Jewish organizations in the integration 
struggle had fuelled the fevered imaginations of conspiracy theorists 
across the American South. Racial segregation operated on the assumption 
16 Herbert R. Moulitz, Report 1957-58 [15 Mar. 1958], Box 1, Folder 2, Anti-Defamation 
League of B'nai B'rith Records, 1946-82, The Amistad Research Center at Tulane 
University. 17 Will Maslow, 
" 
Negro?Jewish Relations in the United States," Gen-10, 56-61, Box 
257: Race Relations: Negroes, American Jewish Committee Papers, Yivo Institute for 
Jewish Research, New York; Richard Yaffe, "Negro Integration and Jews in the 
South," Israel Horizons, 6:6 (June?July 1958), 30; Leonel Weil to Charles J. Bloch, 16 
Jan. 1959, Box 19, Folder 91, Charles J. Bloch Papers, Macon, Georgia Public Library. 
American Jewish Committee member Cecil Alexander similarly recalls a regional 
meeting of the organization at which Montgomery Jews spoke openly against any 
further entanglement in the race issue. Alexander, who was actively involved in the 
integration of his native Atlanta, was criticized for "exposing" Jews in less 
cosmopolitan cities including Montgomery. Cecil Alexander, interview with author, 13 
Nov. 1993. 
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that African-Americans accepted unquestioningly their status as second 
class citizens. When blacks began to mobilize themselves into a mass 
based protest movement, many whites therefore became suspicious. 
Unwilling to accept that African-Americans possessed either the ability or 
the incentive to attack Jim Crow, they searched for the troublemakers 
who had secretly stirred racial unrest in the South, and were now 
manipulating the situation to their own political advantage. This search 
often led segregationists to the national offices of the Jewish defence 
agencies. As one newspaper suggested, white supremacists were 
increasingly of the opinion "that the South's problem 
- its implacable 
enemy 
- is not the Negro but the Northern Jew."18 
As this quotation would suggest, even hard-line segregationists were 
often able to distinguish between northern and southern Jews. It would 
not be long however before the actions of the national organizations 
tarred all Jews with the same brush. In the ominous words of one 
southern writer, "The Hebrew who draws criticism upon himself draws 
it likewise upon Jews everywhere."19 
In the face of such scarcely veiled threats, it was little surprise that 
Montgomery Jews should seek to dissociate themselves from the national 
defence agencies. During a field trip to Alabama in the fall of 1961, 
Benjamin Muse of the Southern Regional Council met with a number of 
Jewish leaders, amongst them Montgomery businessman Eugene 
Heilpern. A man "of liberal convictions," Heilpern had been intimidated 
into silence by the spread of anti-Semitism. During his conversation with 
Muse he handed over a leaflet circulated by the White Citizens' Council 
"which combined rank anti-Semitism with its anti-Negro message." 
Heilpern was in no doubt as to who was to blame for the deteriorating 
political situation. As Muse remarked in his report, Heilpern was "in 
controversy with National Jewish groups" and in particular the adl, 
whom he believed were 
"jeopardizing" the security of Jews in Alabama.20 
In a determined effort to counter the damage done by the national 
defence agencies, Montgomery Jews constructed an impenetrable wall of 
silence around themselves. Their fears were by no means unfounded. 
Between November 1957 and October 1958, terrorists launched a series of 
18 
Harry Golden and Julian Scheer, "Southern Jews and Segregation: Development of 
attitudes and actions regarding a cardinal issue," Jewish Eife, 10:7 (May 1956), 26; 
Presbyterian Outlook, 27 Oct. 1958. 19 William D. Workman, Jr., The Case for the South (New York: The Devin-Adair 
Company, 1959), 119, 223. 20 
Benjamin Muse, confidential memorandum of 18 Oct. 1961, "Alabama: September 
15?17 and October 2?5," Series I, Reel 56, Document 1842, 1954, Southern Regional 
Council Papers, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Atlanta University. 
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bomb attacks on synagogues across the South. Three temples were 
destroyed. A further three survived only when the dynamite failed to 
explode.21 
Montgomery escaped any such incident. Indeed there was reason to be 
optimistic that the forces of massive resistance in Alabama would not 
target Jews. Reports broke in March 1956 that an ideological rift had torn 
the Alabama Citizens' Council in two. The ultra-segregationist Asa Carter 
had been expelled from the Alabama White Citizens' Council for inviting 
anti-Semitic speakers to recruitment drives, and demanding that Jews be 
removed from the organization's membership roster. His newly formed 
North Alabama Citizens' Council excluded anyone who did not "believe 
in the divinity of Jesus Christ," underlining the message by including in 
its journal "an attack on the 'Hadassah newsletter' for picturing a Negro 
and white child together." Horrified that this might endow the movement 
with a reputation for reckless fanaticism rather than responsible 
leadership, other members had established their own Central Alabama 
Citizens' Council. According to its initial press release, this latter group 
was "not interested in religious bias or prejudice," but "concerned only 
in maintaining segregation." Anti-Semitism indeed proved to be a major 
fault-line between the Citizens' Councils and more extreme segregationist 
groups. When the National Citizens' Council held its annual convention 
in Montgomery in August 1958 it elected Roy Harris as its president. 
Harris was 
equally concerned not to allow accusations of anti-Semitism to 
undermine the respectability of the Citizens' Councils. In his words, "anti 
Jews would ruin the meeting." In a similar move, the Montgomery 
County Citizens' Council deplored anti-Semitism in the pages of its 
monthly journal, the States Rights Advocate}2 
Expulsion from the ranks of the Citizens' Council was none the less not 
enough to silence the anti-Semitic extremists. Hate groups seized upon the 
21 
Jackson Toby, "Bombing in Nashville: A Jewish Center and the Desegregation 
Struggle," Commentary, 25:5 (May 1958), 385?89; Nathan Perlmutter, "Bombing in 
Miami: Anti-Semitism and the Segregationists," Commentary, 25:6 (June 1958), 
498-503 ; Arnold Shankman, "A Temple Is Bombed 
? 
Atlanta, 1958," American Jewish 
Archives, i^-.z (Nov. 1971), 125-53; National Jewish Post and Opinion, 29 Nov. 1957; 
Murray Friedman, "Postscript to an Act of Violence," ADL Bulletin, 15:6 (June 
1958), 5; Birmingham Post-Herald, 29 Apr. 1958. 22 New York Times, 6 Mar. 1956; Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized 
Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 19J4?64 (Urbana, Chicago, London : University of 
Illinois Press, 1971), 49-50; Arnold Forster, "The South: New Field for an Old 
Game," ADL Bulletin, 15:8 (Oct. 1958), 1; George Thayer, The Farther Shores of 
Politics: The American Political Fringe Today (London: Allen Lane, 1968), 113-14; 
Arthur J. Levin, "Since the Supreme Court Decision," ADL Bulletin, 15:6 (June 
1958), 6. 
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social unrest caused by the bus boycott, hoping to channel white anger 
towards the Jew. The mails were flooded with anti-Semitic materials, 
inducing a state of panic amongst Montgomery Jews, and forcing the 
national defence 
agencies on to the defensive.23 As late as 1965 
a 
concerned Jewish citizen wrote to the local office of the Anti-Defamation 
League to report that the Alabama state legislature had recently been 
inundated with anti-Semitic literature, including the notorious newsletters 
Common Sense and The Cross and the Flag.2* 
City authorities denounced those responsible for distributing hate 
literature. An editorial in the Montgomery Advertiser similarly insisted that 
"In no other city in this country, could there be a finer group of Jewish 
citizens."25 Yet despite the efforts of both politicians and the press to 
discredit the opinions of anti-Semites, the notion that Jews were the secret 
masterminds behind the civil rights movement captured the imagination 
of a worrying number of white Montgomerians. As Harold Fleming, 
Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council, observed, 
Montgomery "represents an inflamed situation where racial tension has 
been accompanied by overt appeals to anti-Semitism; I gather that 
feelings of insecurity and anxiety in the Jewish community are accordingly 
greater there than in most other Southern cities."26 
In 1958, Retired Rear Admiral John C. Crommelin had launched a 
singularly unsuccessful bid to become the new governor of Alabama, 
capturing less than half of one per cent of the total vote. When the 
segregationist movement in Alabama split over the issue of anti-Semitism 
in 1956, Crommelin had been among those who joined Asa Carter in 
establishing the extremist North Alabama Citizens' Council. Under the 
23 Northern Jewish activists engaged in the civil rights struggle conceded that political 
tensions within the South had increasingly assumed anti-Semitic overtones. Among 
those who acknowledged the difficulties faced by southern Jews were Henry E. Schultz 
of the adl and Frederick F. Greenman, campaign chairman of the Joint Defense 
Appeal. New York Times, 27 Nov. 1956, 13 Apr. 1956. 24 The local citizen was Raymond E. Cohen, owner of a record store in Montgomery. 
Monroe Schlactus, adl Alabama Regional Director, to Raymond E. Cohen, 25 June 
1965, Box 1, Folder 30, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Alabama Regional 
Office, records, 1945?79, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Linn-Henley 
Research Library, Birmingham, Alabama, Public Library. 25 
Quoted in National Jewish Post and Opinion, 25 May 1956. The Advertiser also published 
an article in praise of B'nai B'rith, an organization that "has served American progress 
in the fields of patriotism, charity, health and brotherly understanding." This was in 
spite of the conspicuous support for the boycott by the Anti-Defamation League. 
Montgomery Advertiser, 8 Mar. 1956. 26 Harold C. Fleming to Will Maslow, 14 July 1959, Series 1, Reel 3, 075 5-0756, Southern 
Regional Council Papers. 
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influence of Carter, he had, by the time of his gubernatorial campaign, 
become increasingly outspoken in his belief that the civil rights movement 
was a 
"Jewish?Communist conspiracy."27 
Despite his dismal showing during the election, the old naval officer 
was still a potent threat to the Jewish community. In 1959 Crommelin 
sought election as the new mayor of Montgomery. The Rear Admiral had 
bought air time on one local television channel during his campaign for 
governor a year earlier. He had used the broadcast to scare voters into 
believing "that this bombing of the churches in Montgomery 
- the 
colored churches - was a planned program by the Communist-Jewish 
conspiracy to effect the civil rights legislation." His mayoral campaign 
was marked by equally hysterical accusations. To the dismay of local 
Jews, Crommelin's rhetoric found a receptive audience. On polling day he 
captured 1,760 votes, a respectable 10 per cent of all ballots cast.28 
Montgomery Jews had to safeguard not only against extremists such 
as Crommelin, but also the mainstream segregationist movement. The 
Citizens' Council was not intrinsically anti-Semitic. Some Jews none the 
less suffered as a consequence of its widespread persecution of suspected 
liberals. Almost every member of the political establishment in 
Montgomery was publicly associated with the Citizens' Council, including 
Mayor William Gayle and Police Commissioner Clyde Sellers. As mi a 
lawyer Fred Gray asserts, the Council "pretty much expressed the 
position of the white community." Those who refused to join therefore 
risked accusations of treachery towards the race. Indeed the Council 
launched a door-to-door membership drive, threatening to publish the 
names of those who declined to pay the $5 membership fee. In the words 
of Fred Gray, "the possibilities of reprisals or ostracism" were all too 
real.29 
27 
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The intensity of the criticism levelled by Montgomery Jews none the 
less shocked northern officials in the national defence agencies. Albert 
Vorspan, a social action official of the Union of American Hebrew 
Congregations, met with Jewish leaders across the South in order to 
assuage their anxieties. Although he was seldom able to secure complete 
agreement with southern Jews, he was usually received politely. Such 
was not the case in Montgomery. Having hoped he might convince his 
audience that the national Jewish organizations were taking the high 
moral ground in supporting integration, Vorspan was horrified to hear 
himself and other New York Jews described as "worse than Hitler," 
because of the way they "stirred up anti-Semitism." Nor did the overtures 
of southern officials succeed in striking a more agreeable note. 
Birmingham lawyer Meyer Newfield, who served on both the adl's 
Southeastern Regional Advisory Board and its National Commission, met 
with Montgomery Jews in i960 to discuss the local situation. "Upon 
arrival in Montgomery," he lamented to Arthur J. Levin of the Atlanta 
adl, "I was requested to speak about anything but sit-ins and 
integration."30 
Despite the most determined efforts of the Jewish community, the 
desperate struggle to establish its loyalty had yet to be successfully 
resolved. Having repelled the invading activists from the North, it now 
had to stamp out the traitors within its own ranks. 
During the late 1950s rabbis from across the South overcame not only 
their own fears, but the objections of their congregations, in asserting 
their support for desegregation. Inspired by the social activist teachings 
of their faith, the rabbis often found themselves in the full glare of the 
public spotlight. In the autumn of 1957 the North Carolina Association of 
Rabbis had, for example, issued a resolution approving "wholeheartedly 
and unstintingly" the actions taken in compliance with the Supreme 
Court decision by the school boards in Charlotte, Greensboro and 
Winston-Salem. Later that year, six rabbis in Houston announced similar 
support for the Brown ruling.31 
The political climate in North Carolina and Texas admittedly enabled 
the rabbis to be more 
outspoken than their counterparts in Montgomery. 
Neither state was situated in the Deep South. Such was the strength of 
liberal sentiment that the rabbis were not at risk of serious recrimination. 
30 AI Vorspan, "Birmingham Revisited," Reform Judaism (Fall 1993), 60; Mayer Newfield 
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The rabbis in Houston were, for instance, among a much larger number 
of 173 clergymen who had added their signatures to the statement in 
support of school integration. With the worthy exception of the Reverends 
Robert Graetz and Thomas R. Thrasher, no white minister in 
Montgomery had offered even tacit support for the bus boycott. Graetz 
had been rewarded for his bravery with a bomb which tore through his 
home in August 1956.32 
With white Montgomerians almost unanimous in their opposition to 
integration, anyone who dared voice their dissent would be an 
immediately identifiable target. Should that individual also happen to be 
Jewish it would provide anti-Semites with concrete evidence of a 
" 
Zionist 
conspiracy" against the citizens of Montgomery. Confronted with such an 
appalling prospect, it is little wonder that the rabbis should have remained 
silent. 
Elias Levi was rabbi of the small Sephardic congregation Etz Ayahem. 
His response to the boycott may have been determined by the rabbi of the 
largest and wealthiest synagogue in the city, Eugene Blachschleger. 
Blachschleger had served as spiritual leader of the Reform Temple Beth 
Or since 1934. Since his arrival in the city he had worked ceaselessly as an 
"ambassador of good will between the Jews and Christians." His efforts 
were rewarded when he became the first rabbi ever to be elected to the 
Montgomery Ministerial Association. Blachschleger had every reason to 
fear that not only his own reputation but the relationship which he and 
his congregation had carefully cultivated with the Gentile majority would 
be ruined if he backed the boycott. "If Martin Luther King passed me on 
the street," Blachschleger once informed a fellow rabbi, "I would not 
recognize him. We have never spoken to each other."33 So assiduously did 
Blachschleger avoid public attention that his only mention in the 
Montgomery Advertiser throughout the boycott concerned his discussion of 
the novel Marjorie Morningstar at a meeting of a local literary club.34 
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Blachschleger had every reason to retain his anonymity. The rabbi was 
under no illusion as to the consequences of supporting the civil rights 
struggle. He had after all only to recall the fate suffered by his Conservative 
counterpart, Seymour Atlas. Atlas had occupied the pulpit at Agudath 
Israel for the best part of a decade. Initially he had been seized with the 
same political paralysis as his congregation. Struggling free of his fears he 
eventually appeared alongside Martin Luther King on a local television 
show, and again on a radio discussion of the boycott. Much to the alarm 
of the congregation, his presence attracted national media attention. Life 
magazine included a photograph of the fastidious rabbi, his hair 
brylcreemed and thin moustache finely combed, in a feature on events in 
Montgomery. Atlas was summoned by the board of trustees to an 
emergency meeting, at which he was told to retract his support for the 
boycott. In addition he was ordered to submit any public speech to the 
board "two or three days before printing or delivery of the same."35 
Atlas was unrepentant. At his next service he offered a defiant prayer in 
support of the boycott. It was more than the increasingly irate trustees 
were 
willing to tolerate. Snubbed by his own congregation, a dispirited 
Atlas tendered his resignation. Adamant that such an episode should 
never be 
repeated the trustees resolved that any future rabbi must consent 
to avoid the integration issue "in any matter, shape or form what 
soever."36 
The story of Rabbi Atlas received front page coverage in the national 
Jewish press. Alarmed at the impression others would have of them, the 
members of Agudath Israel issued their own interpretation of events. Dr. 
Irving D. London, a former president of the congregation, insisted that 
the board of trustees had agreed in November 1955, one month before the 
boycott even began, not to renew Atlas's contract.37 
Forty years later it has become all but impossible to separate accusation 
from counter-accusation. The exact circumstances 
surrounding the 
departure of Rabbi Atlas cannot be ascertained. It is none the less of note 
that a similar 
episode had occurred twenty years earlier. On 25 March 
193 1, nine black youths were arrested for the alleged rape of two women 
on a Southern Railway freight train. The Scottsboro case sparked 
outspoken attacks not only against the defendants but their lawyer, a New 
York Jew by the name of Samuel Leibowitz. Desperate not to be 
associated with such a controversial figure, the Alabama Jewish 
community maintained a distinctly low profile throughout the affair. 
35 
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However, one individual would not be silenced. Rabbi Benjamin 
Goldstein was at that time the spiritual leader of Temple Beth-Or. At a 
rally held in support of the Scottsboro boys on 26 March 1933, the rabbi 
openly decried what he considered to be their wrongful conviction. A 
dismayed and disgusted congregation ordered Goldstein to retract his 
statement or 
resign. Goldstein resigned. As the man who succeeded 
Goldstein, Eugene Blachschleger must have been all too aware of these 
events. The resignation of Rabbi Atlas offered him an even more vivid 
reminder of what might happen were he to risk supporting the boycott.38 
The ethical dilemma experienced by the rabbis reflects the difficulties 
faced by the liberal white elite during the desegregation crisis. Southern 
rabbis were torn between personal sympathy for the integrationist stance 
of the national Jewish leadership and the need to maintain the support of 
congregations who virulently opposed change. This precarious position 
was shared to some extent by southern union officials who struggled to 
implement the integrationist policy of the afl?c?o in the face of strident 
resistance from their local membership. Isolation and a sense of paralysis 
distinguished liberal white leadership in the South. Rabbi Blachschleger on 
was no 
exception. 
Blachschleger and Atlas were forced to contend with more than fear on 
the part of their congregations. No matter how legitimate the anxieties of 
Montgomery Jews, the rise of anti-Semitism does not entirely explain 
their refusal to support the civil rights cause. As observers such as Murray 
Friedman and Leonard Dinnerstein have pointed out, southern Jews 
often enjoyed tremendous financial success and widespread social 
acceptance, but only because of their willingness to adapt to the strict 
racial mores of their white 
neighbours.40 This 
was never more true than 
in Montgomery. As Eugene Heilpern informed Benjamin Muse of the 
Southern Regional Council, the local Jewish leadership faced an ethical 
dilemma. Heilpern himself was a successful businessman "closely 
38 Dan R. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South, rev. edn. (Baton Rouge and 
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identified with the power structure" in the city. Such was his personal and 
professional standing that he openly entertained "some thought of 
running for Mayor." Although a man "of liberal convictions" Heilpern 
was alarmed at the intervention of national Jewish organizations in 
support of integration. The identification of all Jews with the civil rights 
cause would inevitably undermine any hope that he had of being elected.41 
While Eugene Heilpern struggled with his conscience over whether to 
abandon his principles in pursuit of personal gain, other Montgomery 
Jews had long since decided where they stood on the race issue. Harry 
Golden included one particularly startling episode in his account of the 
events leading to the resignation of Rabbi Atlas. According to Golden 
one of the trustees at Agudath Israel had suggested to the rabbi that were 
he to become a member of the local Citizens' Council, he could 
" 
remain 
in Montgomery as long as you care." An appalled congregation 
immediately denied that such a conversation had taken place. Dr. Irving 
D. London dismissed the accusation that Montgomery Jews were in any 
way supportive of the Citizens' Council.42 
Whether or not the deception was deliberate is impossible to tell. What 
is certain is that Dr. London did not provide reporters with an accurate 
assessment of the political loyalties of the local Jewish community. "In 
the entire South," asserted Harry Golden, "there is no one less convincing 
than a Jewish white supremacist." Such was the prevailing political 
climate in the South, according to the journalist, that Jews must be seen 
to support segregation, or risk potentially violent reprisals. Eager to 
establish their credentials as loyal white Southerners, many Jews had 
rushed to join the ranks of the Montgomery Citizens' Council. Especially 
among those Jews more recently settled in the city, there was often an 
urgent desire not to be seen as outsiders. As one Jewish Council member 
boasted to journalist Stan Opotowsky: "Look, I hated niggers in 
Philadelphia and I hate 'em in Alabama."43 
Arguably most Jews who joined the Citizens' Council did so not out of 
any ideological conviction, but in order to protect their personal status. 
Although they had taken out their subscriptions, they provided only the 
most perfunctory support, parroting the opinions of those around them. 
It is however not uncommon for an actor who repeats his lines often 
41 
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enough to end up identifying with the part he plays. The individual 
interviewed by Stan Opotowsky suggests exactly this. Jews were, in fact, 
active and outspoken supporters of racial segregation. Financier Les 
Weinstein served on the Board of Directors of the Montgomery Citizens' 
Council.44 Fellow businessman Burk Klein was an equally staunch 
segregationist. Klein corresponded regularly with Charles Bloch, the 
Jewish lawyer who served as vice-president of the States' Rights Council 
of Georgia. In one letter, Klein denounced the American Jewish Congress 
for its active involvement in the civil rights issue. "It is composed of so 
called 'liberals.'" he seethed, "residing in the larger Eastern cities and has 
no 
membership that we know of in the South." Both Bloch and Klein 
were determined to drive an ideological wedge between northern and 
southern Jews. On another occasion the two men discussed plans to 
attack "Northern intrusions" at a 
meeting of the Southeastern Region of 
the United American Hebrew Congregations.45 
By the time of the bus boycott there were many Jewish families whose 
roots in Montgomery stretched back several generations. During its one 
hundred year history the Jewish community had inevitably been shaped 
by the larger societal forces operating at every level of city life. Interaction 
with the Gentile majority had led to the fastening of new ties of loyalty 
besides those which bound together families and members of the same 
faith. Montgomery Jews had in effect evolved into Jewish 
Montgomerians. 
Acceptance of the caste system was part of this larger process of 
acculturation. Ever since their arrival in the 
early nineteenth century, 
Montgomery Jews had been at best passive supporters of the status quo, 
at worst, actively involved in the oppression of African-Americans. 
During the antebellum era, they had engaged in the economic exploitation 
of slaves. When the Civil War erupted they had been willing to fight and 
die for the preservation of that slave property.46 Almost a hundred 
years later Jews opposed the bus boycott not only in order to shield 
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themselves against a segregationist backlash, but because they shared the 
same attitudes towards African-Americans as did other whites. Although 
some Jews were pressurized through force of white public opinion into 
supporting segregation, others were active and willing participants in the 
massive resistance movement. Members of the Montgomery Jewish 
Federation for instance informed the American Jewish Committee that 
they were morally opposed to integration. As they asserted: "The white 
community in the South is generally opposed to desegration... The 
Jewish community in the South is a part of the white community in the 
South."47 
MIA lawyer Fred Gray argues that he was not disappointed by the 
response of Montgomery Jews to the bus boycott, since he never expected 
their support., As Gray puts it, he perceived "no basic distinction 
between Jews and other Caucasians" in terms of their attitude towards the 
race issue.48 Martin Luther King had an altogether more idealistic 
conception of the Jewish community. His opinions were informed by a 
belief in the essential decency of most human beings, as well as an 
awareness of the historical experiences of the Jewish people. None the 
less, he had no substantial evidence to support his faith in the liberalism 
of local Jews. In the climate of fear and hatred which surrounded 
Montgomery during the bus boycott, it was arguably unfair to expect 
Jews to join the civil rights struggle. It is understandable that they should 
have blurred the "basic distinction" between themselves and other 
whites. 
Similar anxieties determined the decision of Jews in other Alabama 
cities such as Dothan and Selma to dissociate themselves from the national 
defence agencies. As Birmingham Jewish community leader Karl 
Friedman asserts, "they surrendered their B'nai B'rith charters and got 
out of the Anti-Defamation League because of the pressure." Events in 
Montgomery therefore provide a microcosmic portrait of the situation 
which confronted all southern Jews during the desegregation crisis. 
Friedman also affirms that the Citizens' Council across Alabama attempted 
to 
"urge or persuade or cajole" Jews into joining their ranks. Inevitably 
most paid the subscription fee.49 
Such actions had by i960 enabled Jews in Montgomery to avoid 
confrontation with either African-Americans or whites. In the years 
which followed, however, the city would be confronted with further 
47 
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racial crises. Jews would have to brace the impact of the Freedom Rides 
and in particular the struggle to desegregate public facilities, including the 
downtown stores. Having endeavoured to sit out the conflict behind the 
lines, they would suddenly discover that their businesses occupied the 
newly shifted battleground. 
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